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Just because you're paranoid doesn't mean no one is following you.
60's saying
I. Introduction
The notion of differences in the cost of financial capital is an 
essential element of the structure-conduct-performance school theory 
of entry barriers as market characteristics which distinguish actual 
from potential competition and which make market structure a factor in 
determining market performance.
Critics of the view that financial markets are a source of entry 
barriers have in some cases argued that financial markets cannot be a 
source of cost differences between actual and potential competitors.
In other cases, they have taken the position that such cost of capital 
differences as are imposed by financial markets are an efficient 
response to the imperfect or incomplete state of knowledge which 
exists in real-world financial markets. Following the generally 
accepted view that a barrier to entry is a market characteristic which 
impedes entry and which has adverse welfare effects, they suggest that 
cost differences imposed by financial markets should not be treated as 
a barrier to entry.
I argue that the literature has obscured the distinction between 
performance in financial markets and performance in product markets. 
Although the cost-of-capital differences imposed by financial markets 
may be an efficient response to the state of information in financial 
markets, incumbent firms can be expected to respond to those cost 




























































































II. Capital Costs as a Barrier to Entry
A. Mainstream
It is riskier to loan money to a small, new firm than to a large, 
established firm. Financial markets will, therefore, impose a higher 
cost of capital on small, new firms, than on large, established firms.
The former, therefore, will be at a cost disadvantage vis-à-vis 
the latter. This will create a cost difference between established 
and entrant firms which the incumbents may exploit, strategically, if 
they find it profitable to do so.
This is the essence of the mainstream view that financial markets 
are a source of barriers to entry. Although associated with Bain 
[1956, p. 1451, the argument has long widespread [see, for example, 
Stigler [1951]).
B. The Efficiency Response (I)
The classic denial that financial markets were a source of cost
differences came in a discussion of the impact of vertical integration
on entry conditions (Bork [1954, p. 195]):1
...the theory that vertical integration prolongs monopoly by 
imposing greater capital requirements upon potential entrants is 
still confidently advanced in the literature as though it, too, 
had not been badly shaken. Of course, vertical integration could 
affect entry only if two levels or stages of operation were 
monopolized by the integrated firm or cartel, so that entrants 
would have to come in on both levels at once. This would indeed 
require greater capital than would entrance upon one level. If 
there are greater-than-competitive profits being made in the 
industry, however, there seems no reason why the increased 
capital necessary for entry would not be forthcoming, unless 
there are impediments in the capital market that prevent capital 
from flowing to areas where it can most profitably be employed. 
Until such impediments have been shown to exist, the fact that 
increased capital is required for vertical integration must be 
assumed to have no adverse effect upon entry into monopolized 
markets.




























































































This argument continues to be made from time to time, as though 
it, too, had not been badly shaken (McGee [1980, p. 297); Easterbrook 
[1981, pp. 269-270]).
C. Transaction Costs in Financial Markets (Williamson)
The theory of transactions costs in financial markets provides an 
explanation for impediments to capital flows of the kind discussed by 
Bork. Because information is imperfect, lenders will assess a risk 
premium which depends on the likelihood of bankruptcy. Every borrower 
will pay a risk premium, but incumbents will benefit from the 
reputation they have established in past dealings with financial 
markets. New firms or firms seeking to greatly expand their scale of 
operation will pay a larger risk premium than established firms.
Entrants, as a class, will suffer a greater cost of capital than 
incumbents.2
D. The Efficiency Response (II)
Even severe critics of the concept of barriers to entry have 
conceded that the argument that transaction costs in financial markets 
are a source of such barriers is "moderately persuasive" (Posner 
[1976, 93]). The discussion of financial markets as a source of entry 
barriers has lately pursued another path. Interest rate differentials 
are an efficient response to the actual (imperfect) state of 
information in financial markets. Thus (Stigler [1967, pp. 290-291]):




























































































...an efficient market...permits all exchange which the traders 
prefer to non-exchange. If we assume away all costs of trading, 
the efficient market will achieve every desired exchange for 
homogeneous goods when there is only one price. ...
The careless and overpopular use of imperfections-in-the- 
capital-market stems from the application of this simple theory 
to inappropriate conditions. ...
Transportation costs are the prototype of all trading costs; 
costs of acquiring knowledge....There is no "imperfection" in a 
market possessing incomplete knowledge if it would not be 
remunerative to acquire (produce] complete knowledge.
And in the same vein (Demsetz [1982, p. 50]]
Larger, older firms generally will be able to borrow more cheaply 
than smaller, younger firms. It is not large capital "requirements," 
but the histories of successful firms, in a world in which 
information is costly to acquire, that constitute the source of 
such interest rate differentials.
III. Product Market Consequences of Transaction Costs in Financial 
Markets
A widely accepted view is that a barrier to entry is some market 
characteristic which imposes a cost on entrants but not incumbents 
(Stigler [1968, p. 67]) and which reduces welfare (von Weizsàcker [1980]). 
Whether financial markets are or are not efficient is irrelevant to 
the welfare consequences of cost differences which arise in financial 
markets for product market performance. If such cost differences 
reduce welfare in product markets, then financial markets are a source 
of entry barriers in this sense.
I therefore examine the product market welfare consequences of 
cost differences imposed by financial markets. Suppose two firms 
supply a market with linear (inverse) demand curve




























































































The two firms have access to the same technology. If they could 
borrow at a risk-free rate of return, they would have identical 
marginal and average cost, c per unit. However, financial markets 
assign a risk premium to each firm. Firm 2 is considered riskier than 
firm 1. Firm 2 pays a greater risk premium than firm 1, which 
translates into a greater unit cost:3 *
(2) c < c, < c2
A. Optimal Production in a Market System, Given Imperfect Information 
in Financial Markets
In the absence of transaction costs in financial markets, the 
ideal production arrangement would be to produce S - a  ̂ c units of 
output, which would clear the market at a price p = c. As information 
is in fact imperfect, this ideal is infeasible. Given imperfect 
information in financial markets, the first-best market performance 
would have firm 1 supply the entire market at price p =■ c,. This 
might occur under a regulatory regime, if regulators were sufficiently 
clever.
The second-best performance would have firm 1 produce S2 * 
a - c2
— g—-  units of output, which would clear the market at 
price p2 «  c2. Such an equilibrium might occur through limit 
pricing.
3. The relation between unit cost and cost of financial capital 
depends on capital intensity; see Martin 11988], One would expect the 
cost of capital to rise as output, and borrowing, rises. The 
assumption of constant unit cost is made for simplicity, to focus on 
the critical issue, which is differences in the cost of capital




























































































In this case, production would occur as cheaply as possible, 
given the state of information in financial markets and the 
organization of production through profit-maximizing firms. Firm 1 
would earn an efficiency rent c2 - c, per unit of output. This is 
a return to an asset of firm 1: its reputation. To collect its
efficiency rent, firm 1 restricts output and holds price above its own 
marginal cost. There is, of course, a deadweight welfare loss 
associated with this output restriction. The deadweight welfare loss 
reflects the difference between the limit price p2 and real-world 
marginal cost, c,.
B. Performance Under Oligopoly
How would market performance under oligopoly compare with second- 
best limit pricing? The answer depends, of course, on the kind of 
oligopoly specified as an alternative to limit pricing. The 
comparison I make is with Cournot quantity-setting duopoly. This 
choice is hallowed by precedent.4 It has the added convenience that 
it can be easily extended, using the device of conjectural variations, 
to cover a wide range of oligopolistic interactions.
It is well known that in quantity-setting duopoly, the lower-cost 
firm has the greater output:5
4. It is the comparison which is usually made to analyze the 
credibility of strategic threats. For examples, see Dixit [1980] and 
Schmalensee [1981],
5. The requirement that q2 be positive imposes a constraint on cost 
differences: q2 is positive if and only if






























































































where c = -g-fc, + c2) is average cost and (so long as q2 is positive)
duopoly equilibrium price exceeds c2=
(5) p - c2 - i=j-(a - c2) - g-(c2 - c,) »  0 .
In this equilibrium, (as shown in Figure 2), both firms earn 
economic profit. Firm 1 additionally earns an efficiency rent, on its 
reduced output.
Firm 1 will prefer oligopoly to limit pricing if its economic 
profit [ (p - Cjlq^ under oligopoly exceeds its foregone rent [(c2 - c^CS;, - q^ 
The low-cost firm will prefer oligopoly to limit pricing so long as
This has an obvious interpretation. The larger is c2 - Cj, 
the greater the rent which the efficient firm gives up by competing 
oligopolistically. If c2 - c, is suf ficiently large, the lower - 
cost firm will prefer to limit price.
The additional welfare loss under oligopoly, compared with the 
limit pricing, has two components. The first is the deadweight 
welfare loss due to restriction of output from S2 to q] + q2.
The second element of welfare loss under oligopoly is the excess 
cost of production on output produced by firm 2 rather than firm 1. 
The latter is a product market welfare loss induced by efficient 





























































































There is an additional welfare consequence of cost differences in 
financial markets. Oligopoly output + q2 is less than optimal 
feasible output S2. Under a limit-pricing arrangement, the low-cost 
firm would collect a rent c2 - c2 per unit on this output. Under 
oligopoly, this output is not produced, and the rent is not collected. 
This represents an income transfer from the low-cost firm to consumers 
(who presumably spend it in other markets!.
IV. Final Remarks6 *
Transactions costs rooted in imperfect information induce 
differences in the cost of capital across firms. These cost 
differences permit behavior which induces welfare losses in product 
markets. Low-cost firms may limit price, collecting efficiency rents 
and inducing a deadweight welfare loss by holding price above marginal 
cost. Or low-cost firms may share the market, which induces 
additional deadweight welfare losses and additional social losses as 
production is inefficiently shifted to high-cost firms.
6. The focus of this paper is competition policy. The analysis 
suggests as well that authorities should encourage, as much as




























































































It follows that financial markets are a source of barriers to 
entry - cost differences between entrants and incumbents which have 
adverse welfare consequences. The importance of the entry barrier 
imposed by financial markets depends on the absolute size of the 
capital investment required for entry. Competitive strategies which 
have the effect of raising capital requirements or making entry 
riskier make entry more difficult, and can be expected to worsen 
market performance because they raise rivals costs.7
Examples of the former will include partial and complete vertical 
integration. Vertical mergers and vertical contractual relationships 
which raise capital requirements will have adverse effects on entry 
conditions and it is appropriate to balance the corresponding welfare 
cost against any benefits which they may yield.
Examples of the latter include occasional episodes of predatory 
pricing or "preemptive entry deterrence”8 Such behavior is likely 
to increase the risk premium placed upon fringe and entrant firms.
7. Thus the classic analysis of financial markets as a source of 
entry barriers ties into the more recent literature on raising rivals’ 
costs as a competitive strategy (Salop and Scheffman (1983, 1987]).
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Figure 2: Welfare Losses Under Cournot Duopoly, Based On Cost
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